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Abstract
Inspired by a military context, we study a Stackelberg production game where a country’s
government, the leader, wants to maximize the production of military assets. The leader
does so by allocating his resources among a set of production facilities. His opponent,
the follower, observes this allocation and tries to destroy the associated production as
much as possible by allocating his destructive resources, for example bombs, among these
facilities. In this paper, we identify a follower’s optimal strategy. For the leader, we show
that an optimal production strategy can be found in the class of so-called seried-balanced
strategies. We present a linear time algorithm that finds an optimal strategy in this class.
Keywords: OR in defense, Stackelberg game, military production, resource allocation
1 Introduction
Strategic bombing is a military strategy that is, among others, used to destroy military pro-
duction facilities in times of war. In order to be less vulnerable to such bombings, a government
can decide to spread its military production over multiple production facilities. Inspired by
this military context, we investigate in this paper how a government should optimally spread
the production of a single type of military asset over its production facilities, while taking into
account the impact of strategic bombing. We do so by introducing and solving a Stackelberg
production game that models such a military setting in times of war.
In this Stackelberg production game, a country’s government (the leader) has to allocate
a fixed amount of resources among several production facilities, in order to maximize the
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production of a single type of military asset (e.g., tanks). For this, the leader takes into account
that each production facility has its own production rate. That means, some production
facilities can produce more assets per resource than others. Once the leader has allocated his
resources, the country’s opponent (the follower) observes this allocation and tries to destroy
the leader’s production as much as possible. The follower does so by allocating a fixed amount
of destructive resources (e.g., bombs) among the production facilities, which will destroy the
production facilities and produced military assets. For this, the follower takes into account
that some production facilities are harder to destroy than others.
In this paper, we study the leader’s and follower’s optimal strategies. First, we identify an
intuitive optimal strategy for the follower. We show that in this optimal strategy, the follower
destroys those production facilities that result in the highest production loss per destructive
resource. Thereafter, we present a linear time algorithm to find an optimal production strat-
egy for the leader. This algorithm, which is the main contribution of this paper, selects a
production strategy from the class of so-called seried-balanced strategies. We prove the cor-
rectness of this algorithm by showing that there always exists an optimal production strategy
in this class.
As the name suggests, the production strategies in this class satisfy two properties. The
first property, balancedness, states that all resources are allocated among a subset of pro-
duction facilities such that it is equally likely for the follower to destroy any of these. The
second property, seriedness, states that this subset consists of those production facilities with
the highest production rates. Balancedness is a commonly seen property in, among others,
military-oriented games (see, e.g., Powell (2009)). However, seriedness is not, and may be
counter intuitive. In particular, this property states that it is always beneficial from the lead-
ers perspective to invest some resources in a production facility with the highest production
rate. This is remarkable, since there is no direct relationship between the difficulty of destroy-
ing this production facility and its production rate. In this paper, we explain why it is optimal
to select a production strategy from the class of seried-balanced strategies.
In the literature, several military-oriented Stackelberg games have been studied. In these
games, the leader and follower typically optimize opposed objective functions (e.g., maximiz-
ing/minimizing military production as in this paper). Since the follower chooses the solution
which leads to the worst case objective function value for the leader, these military-oriented
games are typically expressed as bilevel optimization problems (see, e.g., Dempe (2002)).
Military-oriented Stackelberg games have shown to be relevant for several types of settings.
For instance, Israeli & Wood (2002) study how to route a military supply convoy through a
hostile environment and Morton et al. (2007) illustrate how to optimally protect a border
against smuggling. In another setting, Powell (2009) and Scaparra & Church (2008b) study
how a government must protect its vulnerable locations (e.g., buildings or train stations)
against an opponent that plans to destroy these locations. As a final example, Gutin et al.
(2014) show how a government can delay an opponent’s nuclear weapons development project.
The literature on military-oriented Stackelberg games can be divided in two main streams.
The first one focuses on finding techniques or methods to solve the underlying bilevel opti-
mization problems efficiently (see, e.g., Israeli & Wood (2002); Scaparra & Church (2008a,b);
Liberatore et al. (2011); Cappanera & Scaparra (2011); Gutin et al. (2014); Jiang & Liu (2018);
Starita & Scaparra (2016); Washburn & Wood (1995)). Complementary to these computational-
oriented studies, there also exists a stream of literature that focuses on the analytical tractabil-
ity of Stackelberg games (see, e.g., Bier et al. (2007); Powell (2009); Zhuang & Bier (2011);
Hausken & Zhuang (2011); Shan & Zhuang (2013)). In these studies, the focus is on the iden-
tification and characterization of the leaders and followers optimal strategies. In this paper,
we also identify optimal strategies for both the leader and the follower, and thus we contribute
to this second stream of literature.
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Our Stackelberg production game, and the associated results, may also find applications in
other fields. For instance, in a retail setting, our game illustrates how to distribute products
across countries, while taking into account the possibility of supply disruptions. In such a
case, the retailer could be recognized as the leader, the production rates as the profit margins
per country and the follower’s decision as the worst case supply disruption.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 formally introduces the Stackelberg
production game. In Section 3 we focus on the identification of a follower’s optimal strategy
and in Section 4 we focus on the identification of a leader’s optimal production strategy.
Finally, in Section 5 we summarize our results and provide three directions for future research.
2 The Stackelberg production game
We consider a Stackelberg production game where a country’s government is the leader and the
country’s opponent is the follower. The leader has to allocate Rl ∈ R>0 resources among a set
of N = {1, 2, . . . , n} facilities, in order to maximize the production of a single type of military
asset (e.g., tanks). Once the leader has allocated his resources, the follower observes this
allocation and tries to destroy the produced military assets of the leader as much as possible.
The follower does so by allocating Rf ∈ R>0 destructive resources (e.g., bombs) among the
facilities, which will destroy the facilities and thus also the military assets produced in this
facility.
A strategy for the leader is defined as an allocation of his resources to the facilities. We
denote this strategy by x = (xi)i∈N ∈ R
n
≥0. Since the leader has to allocate Rl resources, such
a strategy needs to satisfy
∑
i∈N xi ≤ Rl. We denote the set of all feasible strategies by
X =
{
x ∈ Rn≥0
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
xi ≤ Rl
}
.
We assume that each facility has a unique production rate. This production rate, denoted by
pi ∈ R>0, is the number of military assets produced per invested resource. Hence, if the leader
allocates xi resources to facility i, a facility production pixi is obtained.
A strategy for the follower is defined as an allocation of his destructive resources to the
facilities. We denote this strategy by y = (yi)i∈N ∈ R
n
≥0. Since the follower has only Rf
destructive resources, such a strategy needs to satisfy
∑
i∈N yi ≤ Rf . Moreover, we assume
that each facility has a unique destruction quantity. This destruction quantity, denoted by
ai ∈ R>0, is the amount of destructive resources needed in order to completely destroy a facility
and its associated production. If the follower allocates yi destructive resources to facility i, a
facility production reduction of pixi
yi
ai
is obtained. We assume that the follower never allocates
more destructive resources than needed. Hence, in addition to the resource constraint, we also
require yi ≤ ai. We denote the set of all feasible strategies by
Y =
{
y ∈ Rn≥0
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
yi ≤ Rf , yi ≤ ai for all i ∈ N
}
. (1)
In order to exclude the trivial case, where the follower has enough destructive resources to
destroy all facilities of the leader, we assume Rf <
∑
i∈N ai.
For a given strategy x ∈ X of the leader and a given strategy y ∈ Y of the follower,
the associated leader’s total production after destruction is given by the sum of the facility
productions minus the sum of the facility production reductions, i.e.,
P(x, y) =
∑
i∈N
pixi −
∑
i∈N
pixi
yi
ai
. (2)
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The following example illustrates how to calculate facility productions, facility production
reductions and total production after destruction. The Stackelberg production game in this
example is used throughout the entire paper.
Example 1. Consider the Stackelberg production game with N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, Rl = 5 and
Rf = 1
3
4
. The production rates {pi}i∈N and destruction quantities {ai}i∈N are presented in
Table 1.
Facility i 1 2 3 4 5
pi 12 8 5 2 1
ai
9
10
1 1
4
1 3
4
Table 1: The production rates and destruction quantities of Example 1.
Suppose the leader applies strategy x =
(
0, 7
10
, 3
10
, 0, 4
)
and the follower applies strategy
y =
(
0, 7
8
, 1
8
, 0, 3
4
)
. Note that indeed both strategies are feasible, i.e., x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . The
resulting facility productions {pixi}i∈N and facility production reductions {pixi
yi
ai
}i∈N are as
presented in Table 2.
Facility i 1 2 3 4 5
pixi 0 5
6
10
11
2
0 4
pixi
yi
ai
0 4 9
10
3
4
0 4
Table 2: Facility productions and facility production reductions of Example 1.
Using Table 2 we conclude that the total production after destruction equals
P(x, y) =
(
5 6
10
+ 11
2
+ 4
)
−
(
4 9
10
+ 3
4
+ 4
)
= 1 9
20
. △
The follower has the aim to minimize the leader’s total production after destruction. We
denote this resulting worst case total production after destruction, for a given strategy x ∈ X
of the leader, by
P(x) = min
y∈Y
P(x, y).
The leader has the possibility to anticipate on this outcome. In particular, the leader will
anticipate by maximizing the worst case total production after destruction, which is formally
defined as
max
x∈X
P(x) = max
x∈X
min
y∈Y
P(x, y).
In this paper, we focus on the identification of an optimal strategy for the leader. Given
the sequential order in which the players move in this Stackelberg production game, we start
in Section 3 with identifying an optimal strategy for the follower. Thereafter, in Section 4,
we present a linear time algorithm to find an optimal strategy for the leader. This algorithm,
which is the main contribution of this paper, selects a strategy from the class of seried-balanced
strategies.
3 Optimal strategy for the follower
In this section we identify an optimal strategy for the follower. We show that this optimal
strategy has a very easy and intuitive structure.
Recall that the set of all feasible strategies for the follower, denoted by Y , is such that
in total at most Rf destructive resources are allocated and moreover at most ai destructive
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resources are allocated to facility i ∈ N (cf. (1)). Given a strategy x ∈ X for the leader, the
follower wants to allocate the destructive resources in such a feasible way that the leader’s total
production after destruction is as low as possible. It follows from (2) that this is equivalent
to maximizing
∑
i∈N pixi
yi
ai
. In Theorem 1 we state that it is optimal for the follower to
destroy the facility with the highest ratio pixi
ai
first, thereafter destroy the facility with the
second highest ratio pixi
ai
, and so on, until no destructive resources are left. Note that, due to
ties in these ratios, there might be different non-increasing orders and thus different optimal
strategies. We now formally describe this set of optimal strategies.
Given a leader’s strategy x ∈ X , we define the destruction ratio as the facility’s production
reduction per destructive resource. Hence, the destruction ratio for facility i ∈ N is given by
the ratio pixi
ai
. Next, let Ωx denote the set of all permutations of N that orders the facilities
based on this destruction ratio in non-increasing order, i.e.,
Ωx =
{
ω ∈ Ω
∣∣∣∣ pω(i)xω(i)aω(i) ≥
pω(j)xω(j)
aω(j)
for all i, j ∈ N with i < j
}
,
where Ω denotes the set of all permutations ofN . Then, every permutation ω ∈ Ωx corresponds
to an optimal strategy for the leader. Namely, allocate aω(1) destructive resources to facility
ω(1) first, then allocate aω(2) destructive resources to facility ω(2), and so on, until we reach
the last facility for which there are still destructive resources available. We denote this facility
by qω, i.e.,
qω = min
{
j ∈ N
∣∣∣∣
j∑
i=1
aω(i) ≥ Rf
}
.
Note that facility qω always exists due to the assumption Rf <
∑
i∈N ai. Since this facility
gets allocated the remaining amount of destructive resources, this facility is the only one that
might be partly destroyed. We denote the set of facilities that are (either fully or partly)
destroyed by Aω, i.e.,
Aω =
{
i ∈ N
∣∣∣∣ ω(i) ≤ ω(qω)
}
.
We are now ready to formally define the optimal strategy corresponding to permutation ω,
denoted by yω. Namely,
yωi =


ai if i ∈ A
ω\{qω},
Rf −
∑
j∈Aω\{qω}
aj if i = q
ω,
0 otherwise.
(3)
The following theorem states that yω is a follower’s optimal strategy. We want to emphasize
that all proofs are relegated to the appendix.
Theorem 1. Let x ∈ X . Then, every strategy yω, with ω ∈ Ωx, is optimal for the follower.
It immediately follows from Theorem 1 that the worst case total production after destruc-
tion is, for every x ∈ X , given by
P(x) = P(x, yω),
where ω ∈ Ωx. The following example illustrates the result of Theorem 1.
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Example 2. Assume the leader applies strategy x =
(
0, 7
10
, 3
10
, 0, 4
)
. The resulting destruction
ratios {pixi
ai
}i∈N are presented in Table 3.
Facility i 1 2 3 4 5
pixi
ai
0 5 6
10
6 0 51
3
Table 3: The destruction ratios of Example 2
Sorting the facilities in non-increasing order based on their destruction ratios results in Ωx =
{(3, 2, 5, 1, 4), (3, 2, 5, 4, 1)}. Based on the destruction quantities {ai}i∈N we can conclude that
it is optimal for the follower to fully destroy facilities 2 and 3, and to destroy facility 5 with
his leftover destructive resources. Hence, for every ω ∈ Ωx, we have qω = 5, Aω = {2, 3, 5}
and yω = (0, 1, 1
4
, 0, 1
2
). By Theorem 1, it follows that the worst case total production after
destruction for strategy x is given by
P(x) = P(x, yω) =
∑
i∈N
pixi −
∑
i∈N
pixi
yωi
ai
= (5 6
10
+ 11
2
+ 4)− (5 6
10
+ 11
2
+ 22
3
) = 11
3
.
Note that strategy y from Example 1 is not an optimal strategy for the follower because
P(x, y) = 1 9
20
> 11
3
= P(x). △
4 Optimal strategy for the leader
In this section we develop a linear time algorithm that finds an optimal strategy for the
leader. Specifically, this algorithm selects an optimal strategy from a set of potential optimal
strategies, called seried-balanced strategies. Among this set of seried-balanced strategies, the
algorithm selects the one for which the worst case total production after destruction is the
highest. The algorithm does so by selecting the seried-balanced strategy with the highest
composed net production rate.
In order to prove the correctness of the algorithm (as formalized in Algorithm 1 in Sec-
tion 4.4), we first need to prove that it suffices to consider only the class of seried-balanced
strategies. This proof consists of the following three steps.
• We first show that each strategy is dominated by an associated balanced or semi-balanced
strategy. As a consequence, it suffices to consider only the class of balanced and semi-
balanced strategies (Section 4.1).
• Then, we show that each semi-balanced strategy is dominated by an associated balanced
strategy. As a consequence, by combining this with the result from the previous step, it
suffices to consider only the class of balanced strategies (Section 4.2).
• Finally, we show that each balanced strategy is dominated by an associated seried-
balanced strategy. As a consequence, by combining this with the result from the previous
step, it suffices to consider only the class of seried-balanced strategies (Section 4.3).
Using these results, we complete the proof of correctness of Algorithm 1 in Section 4.4
by showing a relationship between the worst case total production after destruction and the
composed net production rate. As a result, an optimal strategy can be found by selecting the
seried-balanced strategy with the highest composed net production rate.
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4.1 Reducing to the class of balanced and semi-balanced strategies
In this section we show that, for finding an optimal strategy, it suffices to consider the class
of so-called balanced and semi-balanced strategies. A strategy is balanced if all resources are
allocated among a subset of facilities such that each of them is equally likely being destroyed
by the follower. That means, the destruction ratios of the facilities in this subset are the same.
Definition 1 provides the formal definition of a balanced strategy.
Definition 1. A strategy x is balanced if there exists a set of facilities Sx ⊆ N such that
(i)
∑
i∈N xi = Rl,
(ii) xi > 0 for all i ∈ S
x,
(iii) pixi
ai
=
pjxj
aj
for all i, j ∈ Sx,
(iv) xi = 0 for all i ∈ N\S
x.
A strategy is semi-balanced if there is a subset of facilities that gets resources allocated in
such a way that the follower becomes indifferent between those facilities (similar to a balanced
strategy). Moreover there exists exactly one other facility that receives the remaining resources
in such a way that its destruction ratio is strictly less than the destruction ratio of the facilities
in the subset. Definition 2 provides the formal definition of a semi-balanced strategy.
Definition 2. A strategy x is semi-balanced if there exists a set of facilities Sx ⊆ N and a
facility rx ∈ N\Sx such that
(i)
∑
i∈N xi = Rl,
(ii) xi > 0 for all i ∈ S
x ∪ {rx},
(iii) pixi
ai
=
pjxj
aj
for all i, j ∈ Sx,
(iv) prxxrx
arx
< pixi
ai
for all i ∈ Sx,
(v) xi = 0 for all i ∈ N\(S
x ∪ {rx}).
We illustrate the definitions of balancedness and semi-balancedness by means of two examples.
Example 3. Assume the leader applies strategy x′ = (3
8
, 5
8
, 1
4
, 0, 33
4
). The resulting destruction
ratios {
pix
′
i
ai
}i∈N are presented in Table 4.
Facility i 1 2 3 4 5
pix
′
i
ai
5 5 5 0 5
Table 4: The destruction ratios of Example 3
From this table we can conclude that x′ is a balanced strategy with destruction ratio 5 and
Sx
′
= {1, 2, 3, 5}. Another example of a balanced strategy is strategy x′′ =
(
0, 25
37
, 10
37
, 0, 4 2
37
)
with destruction ratio 515
37
and Sx
′′
= {2, 3, 5}. △
Example 4. Assume the leader applies strategy xˆ = ( 1
15
, 2
3
, 4
15
, 0, 4). The resulting destruction
ratios {pixˆi
ai
}i∈N are presented in Table 5.
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Facility i 1 2 3 4 5
pixˆi
ai
8
9
51
3
51
3
0 51
3
Table 5: The destruction ratios of Example 4
From this table we can conclude that xˆ is a semi-balanced strategy with destruction ratio 51
3
,
S xˆ = {2, 3, 5} and rxˆ = 1. △
Now, we show that it suffices to consider the class of balanced and semi-balanced strategies
as formalized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. There exists an optimal strategy for the leader that is either balanced or semi-
balanced.
The following two examples illustrate the main idea of the proof of Lemma 1, namely that
each strategy is dominated by an associated balanced or semi-balanced strategy.
Example 5. Reconsider strategy x =
(
0, 7
10
, 3
10
, 0, 4
)
. Note that from Table 3 it follows that
this strategy is neither balanced nor semi-balanced. This is also visualized in Figure 1(a).
From Example 2 we learned that in this case the follower will fully destroy facility 2 and 3,
and he will destroy facility 5 partly.
pixi
ai
0-
1-
2-
3-
4-
5-
6-
1 2 3 4 5
Facility i
(a)
pixi
ai
0-
1-
2-
3-
4-
5-
6-
1 2 3 4 5
Facility i
(b)
pixi
ai
0-
1-
2-
3-
4-
5-
6-
1 2 3 4 5
Facility i
(c)
Figure 1: Visualization of the destruction ratios of the strategies in Example 5
Suppose now that the leader will adjust his strategy in such a way that the destruction
ratios of facility 2 and 3 become equal to the destruction ratio of facility 5, namely 51
3
. The
leader achieves this by reducing the number of resources allocated to facility 2 and 3. That
means, by allocating a2
p2
· 51
3
= 2
3
resources to facility 2 and a3
p3
· 51
3
= 4
15
resources to facility 3.
The destruction ratios of this alternative strategy are visualized in Figure 1(b). Observe that,
for this alternative strategy, the optimal strategy for the follower will not change (since the
order (3, 2, 5, 1, 4) is still a non-increasing order of the facilities with respect to the destruction
ratios). Hence, also the worst case total production after destruction stays the same.
Due to this reduction of resources allocated to facilities 2 and 3, there are some unused
resources left. In total there are now 7
10
+ 3
10
−(2
3
+ 4
15
) = 1
15
unused resources. We can use those
resources for increasing the worst case total production after destruction. This can be done
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by allocating the resources to a facility that will not be destroyed by the follower, so facility
1 or 4. Since facility 1 has the highest production rate, it is most beneficial to allocate these
1
15
unused resources to facility 1. This results in a destruction ratio of p1
a1
1
15
= 8
9
for facility 1
and thus the optimal strategy for the follower will not change (since the order (3, 2, 5, 1, 4) is
still a non-increasing order of the facilities with respect to the destruction ratios). As a result,
for this new strategy, which we denote by xˆ = ( 1
15
, 2
3
, 4
15
, 0, 4), the worst case total production
after destruction will increase by p1xˆ1 and thus
P(xˆ) = P(x) + p1xˆ1 = 1
1
3
+ 12
15
= 2 2
15
.
Note that from Example 4 it follows that xˆ is semi-balanced (which is visualized in Figure 1(c)).
Hence, we found a semi-balanced strategy xˆ that dominates our initial strategy x. △
The previous example illustrates that a strategy, that is neither balanced nor semi-balanced,
is dominated by a semi-balanced strategy. In other cases, it might be that such a strategy is
dominated by a balanced strategy. This is illustrated in the following example.
Example 6. Reconsider Example 5 and suppose that, after the described adjustment pro-
cedure to obtain the semi-balanced strategy xˆ, with S xˆ = {2, 3, 5} and rxˆ = {1}, still some
unused resources are left (i.e., Rl > 5). Then, the leader can improve by allocating these
unused resources to a facility that will not be destroyed, so facility 1 or 4. It is most beneficial
to allocate these unused resources to facility 1. The leader can do so until no unused resources
are left or until facility 1 also reaches the destruction ratio of 51
3
(cf. Figure 2(a)). In the
latter case, the leader continues with allocating the unused resources to facility 4 until either
no unused resources are left (cf. Figure 2(b)) or until facility 4 also reaches the destruction
ratio of 51
3
. If still some unused resources are left, the leader continues with allocating the
resources to all facilities such that the destruction ratios remain the same for every facility
(cf. Figure 2(c)). The leader can do so until no unused resources are left.
pixi
ai
0-
1-
2-
3-
4-
5-
6-
1 2 3 4 5
Facility i
(a)
pixi
ai
0-
1-
2-
3-
4-
5-
6-
1 2 3 4 5
Facility i
(b)
pixi
ai
0-
1-
2-
3-
4-
5-
6-
1 2 3 4 5
Facility i
(c)
Figure 2: Visualization of the destruction ratios of the strategies in Example 6
Observe that for all these three strategies, as illustrated in Figure 2, the optimal strategy
for the follower will not change. As a result, for every possible scenario, we obtain a strategy
for the leader that is improved with respect to strategy x. Moreover, note that those three
strategies are all either balanced (Figure 2(a) and (c)) or semi-balanced (Figure 2(b)). Hence,
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for every possible scenario, we found a (semi-) balanced strategy that dominates our initial
strategy x. △
4.2 Reducing to the class of balanced strategies
In the previous section, we showed that, for finding an optimal strategy, it suffices to consider
the class of balanced and semi-balanced strategies. In this section, we show that it suffices to
consider the class of balanced strategies only. We do so by showing that each semi-balanced
strategy is dominated by a balanced strategy. For this, we first consider balanced and semi-
balanced strategies in more detail.
The following lemma states the worst case total production after destruction for a balanced
strategy. In addition, this lemma also provides the allocation of all resources to the facilities.
Lemma 2. Let x be a balanced strategy. Then,
P(x) =


(∑
i∈Sx ai − Rf
)
Rl∑
i∈Sx
ai
pi
if Rf ≤
∑
i∈Sx ai,
0 if Rf >
∑
i∈Sx ai,
and
xi =


aiRl
pi
∑
j∈Sx
aj
pj
if i ∈ Sx,
0 if i ∈ N\Sx.
From the previous lemma it follows that whenever the leader has access to more re-
sources, ceteris paribus, the worst case total production after destruction will increase with
rate
∑
i∈Sx ai−Rf∑
i∈Sx
ai
pi
. We call this rate the composed net production rate and it represents, for
a given balanced strategy, the worst case total production after destruction per invested re-
source. Note that this rate equals zero in case the follower has enough destructive resources to
destroy all facilities of the balanced strategy. The following definition summarizes the above
observations.
Definition 3. The composed net production rate is, for all S ⊆ N with S 6= ∅, defined by
p(S) = max
{∑
i∈S ai − Rf∑
i∈S
ai
pi
, 0
}
,
and p(∅) = 0.
The following corollary follows immediately from Lemma 2 and Definition 3.
Corollary 1. Let x be a balanced strategy. Then,
P(x) = p(Sx)Rl.
The following example illustrates the result of the Corollary 1.
Example 7. It follows from Corollary 1 that the worst case total production after destruction
of balanced strategies x′ with Sx
′
= {1, 2, 3, 5} and x′′ with Sx
′′
= {2, 3, 5} are
P(x′) = p({1, 2, 3, 5})Rl = max
{
a1 + a2 + a3 + a5 − Rf
a1
p1
+ a2
p2
+ a3
p3
+ a5
p5
, 0
}
Rl = 1
3
20
· 5 = 53
4
,
P(x′′) = p({2, 3, 5})Rl = max
{
a2 + a3 + a5 −Rf
a2
p2
+ a3
p3
+ a5
p5
, 0
}
Rl =
10
37
· 5 = 113
37
. △
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We now continue with Lemma 3 that states the worst case total production after destruc-
tion for a semi-balanced strategy. Note that this lemma also uses the definition of composed
net production rate. In addition, this lemma also provides the allocation of all resources to
the facilities.
Lemma 3. Let x be a semi-balanced strategy. Then,
P(x) =


p(Sx)(Rl − xrx) + prxxrx if Rf ≤
∑
i∈Sx ai,
prxxrx
arx

 ∑
i∈Sx∪{rx}
ai − Rf

 if ∑i∈Sx ai < Rf <∑i∈Sx∪{rx} ai,
0 if Rf ≥
∑
i∈Sx∪{rx} ai,
and
xi =


ai(Rl − xrx)
pi
∑
j∈Sx
aj
pj
if i ∈ Sx,
0 if i ∈ N\(Sx ∪ rx).
The following example illustrates the previous lemma.
Example 8. Reconsider the semi-balanced strategy xˆ with S xˆ = {2, 3, 5} and rxˆ = {1}. We
have Rf = 1
3
4
≤ 1+ 1
4
+ 3
4
= a2+ a3+ a5 =
∑
i∈Sxˆ ai and thus, using Lemma 3, the worst case
total production after destruction of this semi-balanced strategy equals
P(xˆ) = p({2, 3, 5})(Rl − xˆ1) + p1xˆ1
= max
{
a2 + a3 + a5 − Rf
a2
p2
+ a3
p3
+ a5
p5
, 0
}
(Rl − xˆ1) + p1xˆ1
= 10
37
(5− 1
15
) + 12 · 1
15
= 2 2
15
.
Note we already calculated this worst case total production after destruction in Example 5. △
By using Corollary 1 and Lemma 3, we are now able to show that it suffices to consider
the class of balanced strategies as formalized in the following lemma.
Lemma 4. There exists an optimal strategy for the leader that is balanced.
The main idea of the proof of Lemma 4 is that each semi-balanced strategy is dominated by
a balanced strategy. Namely, a semi-balanced strategy x is either dominated by the balanced
strategy Sx or the balanced strategy Sx ∪ {rx}. The following example illustrates why this
domination always holds. In particular, we illustrate in this example how the proof makes use
of the composed net production rate and the results of Corollary 1 and Lemma 3.
Example 9. Reconsider the semi-balanced strategy xˆ with S xˆ = {2, 3, 5} and rxˆ = {1}.
Observe that the production rate of rxˆ is higher than the composed net production rate of S xˆ,
i.e.,
p1 = 12 >
10
37
= p({2, 3, 5}). (4)
From Lemma 3 we can conclude that exchanging resources from S xˆ to facility 1, as long as the
follower’s optimal strategy stays the same, is beneficial. In other words, in order to improve
the strategy for the leader, one can increase xˆ1 (and thus decrease xˆ2, xˆ3 and xˆ5) such that
the destruction ratio of facility 1 becomes equal to the destruction ratios of S xˆ. This results in
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the balanced strategy x′ with Sx
′
= {1, 2, 3, 5}, which dominates the semi-balanced strategy
xˆ.
Note that in case the inequality in (4) would be reversed, then exchanging resources from
facility 1 to S xˆ would be beneficial. As a result, the balanced strategy x′′ with Sx
′′
= {2, 3, 5}
would dominate the semi-balanced strategy xˆ. △
4.3 Reducing to the class of seried-balanced strategies
In this section, we show that, for finding an optimal strategy, it suffices to consider a proper
subset of the class of balanced strategies: the class of seried-balanced strategies. A balanced
strategy is called seried-balanced if only facilities up to a certain threshold index get resources
allocated. Definition 4 provides the formal definition of a seried-balanced strategy.
Definition 4. A balanced strategy x ∈ X is seried-balanced if
Sx = {1, 2, . . . , sx},
where sx the highest indexed facility in Sx, i.e., sx = max{i | i ∈ Sx}.
Recall that the production rates are in non-increasing order (i.e., p1 ≥ p2 ≥ . . . ≥ pn).
As a consequence, a seried-balanced strategy always includes the facilities with the highest
production rates. The following example illustrates the definition of a seried-balanced strategy.
Example 10. The set of all seried-balanced strategies is given by
{x ∈ X | x is balanced, Sx ∈ {{1}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}}} .
Hence, balanced strategy x′ with Sx
′
= {1, 2, 3, 5} is not seried-balanced, since facility 4 does
not get any resources allocated while facility 5 does. △
In order to prove that we can restrict our attention to the class of seried-balanced strategies,
we show that every balanced strategy is dominated by a seried-balanced strategy. We show
this domination by adding facilities to a balanced strategy and/or removing facilities from
a balanced strategy until the strategy becomes seried-balanced. The following lemma states
when it is beneficial (or not) to add a facility to (or remove a facility from) a balanced strategy.
Lemma 5. Let x and x′ be two balanced strategies such that Sx ∩ Sx
′
= ∅. Moreover, let x′′
be the balanced strategy such that Sx
′′
= Sx ∪ Sx
′
.
(i) If pi ≥ p(S
x) for all i ∈ Sx
′
, then p(Sx
′′
) ≥ p(Sx);
(ii) If pi ≤ p(S
x) for all i ∈ Sx
′
, then p(Sx
′′
) ≤ p(Sx);
(iii) If pi ≥ p(S
x′′) for all i ∈ Sx
′
, then p(Sx
′′
) ≥ p(Sx);
(iv) If pi ≤ p(S
x′′) for all i ∈ Sx
′
, then p(Sx
′′
) ≤ p(Sx).
By exploiting Lemma 5, we are able to show that it suffices to consider the class of seried-
balanced strategies. This is formalized in the following lemma.
Lemma 6. There exists an optimal strategy for the leader that is seried-balanced.
The following example illustrates the main idea of the proof of Lemma 6. Namely, how one
should add facilities to a balanced strategy and/or remove facilities from a balanced strategy
until a seried-balanced strategy is obtained that dominates the initial balanced strategy.
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Example 11. Reconsider the balanced strategy x′ with Sx
′
= {1, 2, 3, 5} and recall that this
strategy is not seried-balanced. Note that the production rate of facility 4 is higher than the
composed net production rate of Sx
′
, i.e.,
p4 = 2 > 1
3
20
= p({1, 2, 3, 5}).
Therefore, it follows from Lemma 5(i) that p({1, 2, 3, 4, 5}) ≥ p({1, 2, 3, 5}). As a result, due
to Corollary 1, the strategy that is balanced over all facilities dominates balanced strategy x′.
Next, note that the production rate of facility 5 is lower than the composed net production
rate of all facilities together, i.e.,
p5 = 1 < 1
13
30
= p({1, 2, 3, 4, 5}).
Therefore, it follows from Lemma 5(iv) that p({1, 2, 3, 4}) ≥ p({1, 2, 3, 4, 5}). As a result, due
to Corollary 1, the seried-balanced strategy x∗ with Sx
∗
= {1, 2, 3, 4} dominates the strategy
that is balanced over all facilities.
In summary, the seried-balanced strategy x∗ dominates the balanced strategy x′, which
concludes this example. △
4.4 Algorithm for finding an optimal strategy for the leader
In this section, we provide a linear time algorithm that finds an optimal strategy for the leader.
For this, we first make the following three observations.
• For finding an optimal strategy, it suffices to consider the class of seried-balanced strate-
gies (Section 4.3).
• For a Stackelberg production game with n facilities, there are n seried-balanced strategies
(Definition 4 and Example 10).
• For each seried-balanced strategy, the worst case total production after destruction
equals the composed net production rate times the leader’s amount of resources (Corol-
lary 1).
From these observations it follows that selecting, from all the n seried-balanced strategies, a
strategy with the highest composed net production rate results in an optimal strategy. One
can do so by calculating the composed net production rate of all these strategies.
We now explain why there is no need to calculate the composed net production rate of all
the n seried-balanced strategies. First, recall that the production rates are in non-increasing
order (i.e., p1 ≥ p2 ≥ . . . ≥ pn). Moreover, from Lemma 5(i) and (ii), we learned that
adding a facility to a balanced strategy is beneficial (not beneficial), if the production rate
of that facility is higher (lower) than the composed net production rate of that balanced
strategy. Hence, if we start with calculating the composed net production rate of facility 1,
then calculate the composed net production rate of facility 1 and 2, and so on, we can stop
once the production rate of a facility is at most the composed net production rate of all its
preceding facilities. Then, the seried-balanced strategy that corresponds to the last considered
composed net production rate is an optimal strategy. In summary, there is no need to calculate
the composed net production rate of all the n seried-balanced strategies.
Using the conclusions from above, we present in Algorithm 1 the pseudocode of a procedure
that identifies an optimal strategy for the leader.
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Algorithm 1: Finding an optimal strategy
Input: Stackelberg production game (N, {ai}i∈N , {pi}i∈N , Rl, Rf )
Output: an optimal strategy x∗
S := {1};
i := 2;
while pi > max
{
∑
i∈S ai−Rf∑
i∈S
ai
pi
, 0
}
and i ≤ n do
S := S ∪ {i};
i := i+ 1;
end
for j = 1 to i− 1 do
x∗j :=
aiRl
pi
∑
j∈S
aj
pj
;
end
for j = i to n do
x∗j := 0;
end
The following theorem states that Algorithm 1 always finds an optimal strategy.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 1 is a linear time algorithm for finding an optimal strategy for the
leader.
We conclude this section with an example that explains Algorithm 1 step by step.
Example 12. In the initialization step we set S := {1}. We move on with the following
iterative steps.
• Iteration i = 2: Since p2 = 8 > 0 = max
{
∑
2
i=1 ai−Rf∑
2
i=1
ai
pi
, 0
}
, it follows from Lemma 5(i)
that it is beneficial to add facility 2 to the seried-balanced strategy and thus we set
S := S ∪ {2} = {1, 2}.
• Iteration i = 3: Since p3 = 5 >
3
4
= max
{
∑
3
i=1 ai−Rf∑
3
i=1
ai
pi
, 0
}
, we set S := S∪{3} = {1, 2, 3}.
• Iteration i = 4: Since p4 = 2 > 1
3
5
= max
{
∑
4
i=1 ai−Rf∑
4
i=1
ai
pi
, 0
}
, we set S := S ∪ {4} =
{1, 2, 3, 4}.
• Iteration i = 5: Since p5 = 1 6> 1
13
15
= max
{
∑
5
i=1 ai−Rf∑
5
i=1
ai
pi
, 0
}
, it follows from Lemma 5(ii)
that it is not beneficial to add facility 5 to the seried-balanced strategy and thus this
iteration will not be considered and S will not be updated.
Hence, the algorithm returns the seried-balanced strategy x∗ = (1
2
, 5
6
, 1
3
, 31
3
, 0). By Theorem 2
it follows that this strategy is an optimal strategy for the leader. Note that under this optimal
strategy x∗, we have P(x∗) = 113
15
· 5 = 91
3
. △
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5 Conclusions
Inspired by a military context, we studied a Stackelberg production game, where a leader
wants to maximize his production and a follower tries to destroy this production as much as
possible. This paper focused on identifying the leader’s and follower’s optimal strategies. In
particular, we showed that a leader’s optimal production strategy can be found in the class
of seried-balanced strategies. Moreover, we presented a linear time algorithm that finds an
optimal production strategy in this class.
For future research, we identify three research directions. These directions are based on our
modelling assumptions. Firstly, we implicitly assumed in our model that each production fa-
cility has ample production capacity (i.e., the leader can, for example, allocate all his resources
to one production facility). In practice, however, production facilities are sometimes restricted
by their production capacities. This calls for studying our model with a maximum production
capacity constraint per production facility. By incorporating this constraint, balanced strate-
gies are not always feasible anymore and thus it is unclear whether each production strategy
is still dominated by a balanced strategy.
Secondly, we assumed in our model that the difficulty of destroying a production facility
is independent of the number of military assets produced per production facility. However, in
practice, there might be a relationship between these two components. Including such a de-
pendency into our model forms a second direction for future research. For this extension, the
leader’s set of production strategies will depend on the decision of the follower. Fischetti et al.
(2019) indicate that incorporating such a dependency might make a Stackelberg game compu-
tationally hard. It would be interesting to see whether this is also the case for our Stackelberg
production game.
Finally, we assumed in our model that the number of military assets produced is linear
in the amount of resources allocated. However, in practice, production quantities might be
affected by (dis)economies of scale. As a consequence, we suggest to study an extension of our
model, where the number of military assets produced is non-linear in the amount of resources
invested. Since the proof of Lemma 6 uses this linearity, it is unlikely that, for such an
extension, we can still restrict our attention to the class of seried-balanced strategies.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we provide the proofs of all lemmas and theorems stated in this paper. For
notional convenience in the proofs of Lemma 1 and 3, we rewrite (2) as
P(x) = xqωpqω
(
1−
yωqω
aqω
)
+
∑
i∈N\Aω
xipi. (5)
Note that this equivalence follows directly from the definition of Aω and qω.
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. The aim of the follower is to minimize the leader’s total production after destruction,
i.e.,
min
y∈Y
{P(x, y)} = min
y∈Y
{∑
i∈N
xipi
(
1−
yi
ai
)}
=
∑
i∈N
xipi −max
y∈Y
{∑
i∈N
pixi
ai
yi
}
.
Note that the second equality holds because
∑
i∈N xipi is a constant and thus it can be taken
outside the minimum. The second equality also follows from the fact that minimizing a
function over its argument is equivalent to maximizing that function over the same argument
with a sign change.
Now, let ω ∈ Ωx. Observe that, since the ratio pixi
ai
is a constant for all i ∈ N in the
maximum, it is optimal for the follower to consider the facilities in non-increasing order with
respect to ratio pixi
ai
, i.e., to consider the facilities in order ω. Hence, the follower allocates his
destructive resources facility by facility, starting from the facility with highest ratio, i.e., the
first facility in ω, towards the facility with lowest ratio, i.e., the last facility in ω. Every time
a facility is considered, the follower allocates as many destructive resources as possible to this
facility, while respecting both the individual (yi ≤ ai for all i ∈ N) and total (
∑
i∈N yi ≤ Rf )
resource constraints. This optimal allocation for the follower is exactly how strategy yω is
defined in (3), which completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Let x be an optimal strategy and assume x is neither balanced nor semi-balanced.
From strategy x we will construct an alternative optimal strategy x′ that is either balanced
or semi-balanced, which proves the lemma. The outline of the proof is as follows and consists
of three steps. First, we will construct an alternative strategy x′. Second, we will prove that
strategy x′ is either balanced or semi-balanced. At last, we will prove that strategy x′ is
equally good or better than strategy x, which implies that x′ is also an optimal strategy.
Step 1: Constructing an alternative strategy x′:
Let ω ∈ Ωx. For notational convenience we denote in this proof qω by q and Aω by A. In
order to construct an alternative optimal strategy x′, we distinguish between two cases.
Case 1: Assume Rl <
∑
i∈N
aipqxq
aqpi
. We will construct a strategy x′ that is either balanced or
semi-balanced at the level of pqxq
aq
. In particular, in strategy x′, all facilities in A get resources
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allocated in a balanced way at level pqxq
aq
and the facilities in N\A get resources allocated in a
greedily way based on their production rate, while respecting the leader’s resource constraint.
Note that the facilities in N\A are in non-increasing order with respect to their production
rates (pi ≥ pj for all i, j ∈ N with i < j), which implies that we allocate these resources
facility by facility (i.e., starting from the facility with lowest index towards the facility with
highest index in N\A) in a balanced way up to the level of pqxq
aq
.
Following this procedure, we define facility k ∈ N\A as the highest indexed facility that
gets a positive amount of resources allocated. That means, we define facility k ∈ N\A as
follows
k = min

j ∈ N\A
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈N\A:
i≤j
aipqxq
aqpi
≥ Rl −
∑
i∈A
aipqxq
aqpi

 .
Note that facility k exists due to the assumption for Case 1. Next, define
B = {i ∈ N\A | i < k}.
Observe that B might be the empty set. Now, we are ready to introduce our strategy x′
formally. Strategy x′ is defined as
x′i =


aipqxq
aqpi
if i ∈ A ∪B,
Rl −
∑
j∈A∪B
ajpqxq
aqpj
if i = k,
0 otherwise.
Case 2: Assume Rl ≥
∑
i∈N
aipqxq
aqpi
. In this case, we will construct a strategy x′ that is balanced
at level Rl∑
i∈N
ai
pi
. In doing so, we define our strategy x′ as
x′i =
aiRl
pi
∑
j∈N
aj
pj
, (6)
for all i ∈ N .
Step 2: Proving that x′ is either balanced or semi-balanced:
We distinguish between the previously defined two cases and we will formally prove for each
case that x′ is either balanced or semi-balanced.
Case 1: First, observe that, based on the definition of facility k and set B, we have
Rl ≤
∑
i∈A
aipqxq
aqpi
+
∑
i∈N\A:
i≤k
aipqxq
aqpi
=
∑
i∈A
aipqxq
aqpi
+
∑
i∈B
aipqxq
aqpi
+
akpqxq
aqpk
=
∑
i∈A∪B∪{k}
aipqxq
aqpi
.
We will prove that x′ is balanced in case of an equality (i.e., Rl =
∑
i∈A∪B∪{k}
aipqxq
aqpi
) and semi-
balanced in case of a strict inequality (i.e., Rl <
∑
i∈A∪B∪{k}
aipqxq
aqpi
) in the above equation.
Case 1a: Assume Rl =
∑
i∈A∪B∪{k}
aipqxq
aqpi
. So, x′k = Rl−
∑
j∈A∪B
ajpqxq
aqpj
= akpqxq
aqpk
. We will prove
that x′ is balanced. For this, we claim that
Sx
′
= (A ∪ B ∪ {k}).
We will now prove that x′ satisfies the three conditions of a balanced strategy.
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(i) From the definition of x′ it follows that∑
i∈N
x′i =
∑
i∈A∪B
x′i + x
′
k =
∑
i∈A∪B
aipqxq
aqpi
+Rl −
∑
j∈A∪B
ajpqxq
aqpj
= Rl.
(ii) Let i ∈ Sx
′
. We will first show xq > 0. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that xq = 0.
Then, due to the assumption for Case 1, we have Rl <
∑
i∈N
aipqxq
aqpi
= 0, which contradicts
Rl ∈ R<0 and thus xq > 0.Therefore, in combination with the definition of x
′, we obtain
x′i =
aipqxq
aqpi
> 0.
(iii) From the definition of x′ it follows that, for all i, j ∈ Sx
′
, we have
pix
′
i
ai
= pqxq
aq
=
pjx
′
j
aj
.
(iv) From the definition of x′ it follows that x′i = 0 for all i ∈ N\S
x′.
Case 1b: Assume Rl <
∑
i∈A∪B∪{k}
aipqxq
aqpi
. We will prove that x′ is semi-balanced. For this, we
claim that
Sx
′
= A ∪ B,
rx
′
= k.
We will now prove that x′ satisfies the four conditions of a semi-balanced strategy.
(i) In exactly the same way as in Case 1a, we can prove that this first condition holds.
(ii) In exactly the same way as in Case 1a, we can prove that this second condition holds.
(iii) In exactly the same way as in Case 1a, we can prove that this third condition holds.
(iv) From the definition of facility k it follows that
∑
i∈A∪B
aipqxq
aqpi
< Rl. As a consequence,
x′k = Rl −
∑
j∈A∪B
ajpqxq
aqpj
> 0.
Next, we have ∑
i∈A∪B∪{k}
aipqxq
aqpi
> Rl =
∑
i∈N
x′i =
∑
i∈A∪B
aipqxq
aqpi
+ x′k,
where the inequality follows from the assumption for Case 1b and the last equality follows
from the construction of x′. Hence, x′k <
akpqxq
aqpk
and thus, for all i ∈ Sx
′
, we have
pkx
′
k
ak
<
pqxq
aq
=
pix
′
i
ai
.
(v) From the definition of x′ it follows that x′i = 0 for all i ∈ N\(S
x′ ∪ rx
′
).
Case 2: We will prove that x′ is balanced. For this, we claim that
Sx
′
= N.
We will now prove that x′ satisfies the three conditions of a balanced strategy.
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(i) From the definition of x′ it follows that
∑
i∈N
x′i =
∑
i∈N
aiRl
pi
∑
j∈N
aj
pj
= Rl.
(ii) Let i ∈ Sx
′
. From the definition of x′ it follows that x′i > 0.
(iii) From the definition of x′ it follows that, for all i, l ∈ Sx
′
, we have
pixi
ai
=
Rl∑
j∈N
aj
pj
=
plxl
al
.
(iv) Note that N\Sx
′
= ∅ and thus this last condition automatically holds.
Step 3: Proving that x′ is also an optimal strategy:
We distinguish again between the previously defined two cases and we will prove for each case
that strategy x′ is equally good or better than strategy x. This implies that x′ is also an
optimal strategy. For both cases we use that for every ω ∈ Ωx we have
pixi
ai
≥
pqωxqω
aqω
≥
pjxj
aj
, (7)
for all i ∈ Aω, j ∈ N\Aω. These inequalities follow from the definitions of Ωx, Aω and qω.
Case 1: By the construction of x′ we have
∑
i∈N\A
x′i = Rl −
∑
i∈A
x′i = Rl −
∑
i∈A
aipqxq
aqpi
(7)
≥ Rl −
∑
i∈A
xi ≥
∑
i∈N\A
xi, (8)
where the last inequality follows from the fact x ∈ X . As a consequence,∑
i∈N\A
x′ipi = max
(zi)i∈N\A
∑
i∈N\A
zipi
s.t.
∑
i∈N\A
zi ≤
∑
i∈N\A
x′i
zi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N\A
zi ≤
aipqxq
aqpi
∀i ∈ N\A
(7),(8)
≥
∑
i∈N\A
xipi, (9)
where the equality follows from the fact that the construction of x′ is such that the facilities in
N\A get resources allocated in a greedily way based on their production rate, while respecting
the leader’s resource constraint and the facility’s capacity constraint. The inequality follows
from the fact that (xi)i∈N lies in the feasible facility of the corresponding LP-problem, due
to (8) (implying the first constraint), due to (7) (implying the third constraint), and due to
the fact x ∈ X and thus xi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N\A (implying the second constraint).
Now, observe that, by construction of x′, we have, for j ∈ B,
pjx
′
j
aj
=
pqxq
aq
. (10)
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Next, as shown in Case 1a and Case 1b of Step 2, we have
x′k ≤
akpqxq
aqpk
. (11)
At last, by construction of x′, we have, for j ∈ N\(A ∪ B ∪ {k}),
x′j = 0 ≤
ajpqxq
aqpj
. (12)
Hence, from (10), (11) and (12) it follows that, for all j ∈ N\A, we have
pqxq
aq
≥
pjx
′
j
aj
. (13)
Note that, by the construction of x′, we also have
x′q =
aqpqxq
aqpq
= xq. (14)
Hence, for all i ∈ A, j ∈ N\A, we have
pix
′
i
ai
=
pqxq
aq
(14)
=
pqx
′
q
aq
(14)
=
pqxq
aq
(13)
≥
pjx
′
j
aj
, (15)
where the first equality follows from the construction of x′. It follows from (15) that there
exists a permutation ω′ ∈ Ωx
′
such that qω
′
= q and Aω
′
= A. As a consequence, also yω
′
= yω.
Hence,
P(x′)
(5)
= x′
qω
′pqω′
(
1−
yω
′
qω
′
aqω′
)
+
∑
i∈N\Aω′
x′ipi
= x′qpq
(
1−
yωq
aq
)
+
∑
i∈N\A
x′ipi
(14),(9)
≥ xqpq
(
1−
yωq
aq
)
+
∑
i∈N\A
xipi
(5)
= P(x).
Hence, strategy x′ is equally good or better than strategy x and thus x′ is also an optimal
strategy.
Case 2: We will first define an alternative strategy, called strategy xˆ. In this strategy, every
facility in N gets resources allocated in a balanced way, at level pqxq
aq
. We will prove that
strategy xˆ is equally good or better than strategy x. Thereafter, we will prove that strategy
x′ is equally good or better than strategy xˆ, implying that strategy x′ is also equally good or
better than strategy x. As a result, x′ is also an optimal strategy.
Define strategy xˆ as follows
xˆi =
aipqxq
aqpi
, (16)
for all i ∈ N . Now, observe that, for all i ∈ (N\A) ∪ {q}, it follows that
xi
(7)
≤
aipqxq
aqpi
(16)
= xˆi, (17)
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where the inequality is an equality for i = q. Moreover, observe that, for all i, j ∈ N , we have
pixˆi
ai
(16)
=
pqxq
aq
(16)
=
pj xˆj
aj
,
and thus ω ∈ Ωxˆ. From this we conclude
P(xˆ)
(5)
= xˆqpq
(
1−
yωq
aq
)
+
∑
i∈N\A
xˆipi
(17)
≥ xqpq
(
1−
yωq
aq
)
+
∑
i∈N\A
xipi
(5)
= P(x). (18)
Now, we will focus on strategy x′. Recall from (6) that in strategy x′ every facility in N gets
resources allocated in balanced way, at level Rl∑
i∈N
ai
pi
. First, observe that, for all i ∈ N , we
have
x′i
(6)
=
aiRl
pi
∑
j∈N
aj
pj
≥
ai
∑
j∈N
ajpqxq
aqpj
pi
∑
j∈N
aj
pj
=
aipqxq
aqpi
(16)
= xˆi, (19)
where the inequality follows from the assumption for Case 2. Moreover, observe that, for all
i, j ∈ N , we have
pix
′
i
ai
(6)
=
Rl∑
k∈S
ak
pk
(6)
=
pjx
′
j
aj
,
and thus ω ∈ Ωx
′
. From this we conclude
P(x′)
(5)
= x′qpq
(
1−
yωq
aq
)
+
∑
i∈N\A
x′ipi
(19)
≥ xˆqpq
(
1−
yωq
aq
)
+
∑
i∈N\A
xˆipi
(5)
= P(xˆ),
where the last equality also follows from ω ∈ Ωxˆ. This implies together with (18) that
P(x′) ≥ P(x),
and thus x′ is also an optimal strategy.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Let ω ∈ Ωx. For notational convenience we denote in this proof Sx by S, rx by r, qω by
q and Aω by A. From the definition of a semi-balanced strategy it follows immediately that,
for all i ∈ N\(S ∪ {r}), we have
xi = 0. (20)
Next, let i ∈ S. It follows from the definition of a semi-balanced strategy that, for all j ∈ S,
we have pixi
ai
=
pjxj
aj
and thus xj =
ajpixi
aipj
. As a consequence,
Rl =
∑
j∈N
xj
(20)
= xr +
∑
j∈S
xj = xr +
∑
j∈S
ajpixi
aipj
= xr +
pixi
ai
∑
j∈S
aj
pj
,
where the first equality follows from the definition of a semi-balanced strategy. Hence, for all
i ∈ S, we have
xi =
ai(Rl − xr)
pi
∑
j∈S
aj
pj
, (21)
which concludes the first part of the lemma.
For the second part of the lemma, we distinguish from now on between five different cases.
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Case 1: Assume Rf <
∑
i∈S ai. Then, A ⊆ S and thus
P(x)
(5)
= xqpq
(
1−
yωq
aq
)
+
∑
i∈N\A
xipi
= −
xqpq
aq
yωq +
∑
i∈(N\A)∪{q}
xipi
= −
xqpq
aq
yωq +
∑
i∈(S\A)∪{q}
xipi +
∑
i∈N\S
xipi
= −
xqpq
aq
yωq +
∑
i∈(S\A)∪{q}
xipi + xrpr +
∑
i∈N\(S∪{r})
xipi
(3),(20),(21)
= −
(Rl − xr)∑
j∈S
aj
pj

Rf − ∑
i∈A\{q}
ai

+ ∑
i∈(S\A)∪{q}
ai(Rl − xr)∑
j∈S
aj
pj
+ xrpr
=
(∑
i∈S ai − Rf
)
(Rl − xr)∑
i∈S
ai
pi
+ prxr,
= p(S)(Rl − xr) + prxr,
where the second equality holds because q ∈ A. The third equality follows from the fact that
N\A can be partitioned in the sets S\A and N\S, due to the fact that A ⊆ S. The fourth
equality holds because r 6∈ S. For the penultimate equality we use q ∈ A ⊆ S and thus
((S\A) ∪ {q}) ∪ (A\{q}) = S. For the last equality we use Rl <
∑
i∈S ai (the assumption for
Case 1) and thus p(S) =
(
∑
i∈S ai−Rf)(Rl−xr)∑
i∈S
ai
pi
.
Case 2: Assume Rf =
∑
i∈S ai and thus p(S) = 0. Then, we have A = S and y
ω
q = aq. As a
consequence,
P(x)
(5)
= xqpq
(
1−
yωq
aq
)
+
∑
i∈N\A
xipi
= xqpq
(
1−
aq
aq
)
+
∑
i∈N\S
xipi
(20)
= xrpr.
Case 3: Assume
∑
i∈S ai < Rf <
∑
i∈S∪{r} ai. Then, we have A = S ∪ {r} and q = r. As a
consequence,
P(x)
(5)
= xqpq
(
1−
yωq
aq
)
+
∑
i∈N\A
xipi
= xrpr
(
1−
yωq
ar
)
+
∑
i∈N\(S∪{r})
xipi
(3),(20)
= xrpr
(
1−
Rf −
∑
i∈S ai
ar
)
=
prxr
ar

 ∑
i∈S∪{r}
ai −Rf

 .
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Case 4: Assume Rf =
∑
i∈S∪{r} ai. Then, A = S ∪ {r} and y
ω
q = aq. As a consequence,
P(x)
(5)
= xqpq
(
1−
yωq
aq
)
+
∑
i∈N\A
xipi = xqpq
(
1−
aq
aq
)
+
∑
i∈N\(S∪{r})
xipi
(20)
= 0.
Case 5: Assume Rf >
∑
i∈S∪{r} ai. Then, S∪{r} ⊆ A\{q} and thus (N\A)∪{q} = N\(A\{q})
⊆ N\(S ∪ {r}). Hence, it follows from (20) that xi = 0 for all i ∈ (N\A) ∪ {q}. As a
consequence,
P(x)
(5)
= xqpq
(
1−
yωq
aq
)
+
∑
i∈N\A
xipi = 0.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. This lemma follows directly from the proof of Lemma 3 by applying the definition of
composed net production rate (Definition 3) and taking xr = 0. (Note that this is possible
because that proof doesn’t require xr > 0 or xr 6= 0 in any of the arguments.)
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Let x be an optimal strategy that is either balanced or semi-balanced. Note that such a
strategy always exists due to Lemma 1. If x is balanced, then the theorem holds immediately.
Therefore, we assume x is semi-balanced. From strategy x we will construct two alternative
balanced strategies, called strategy x′ and x′′. Next, we will prove that at least one of them
is equally good or better than strategy x, which implies that this strategy is also an optimal
strategy.
For notational convenience we denote in this proof Sx by S and rx by r. Next, let x′ and
x′′ be the two unique balanced strategies such that Sx
′
= S and Sx
′′
= S∪{r}. We distinguish
between four cases and for each case we show that either P(x′) ≥ P(x) or P(x′′) ≥ P(x)
holds.
Case 1: Assume Rf ≥
∑
i∈S∪{r} ai. Then, by Corollary 1 and Lemma 3 we have
P(x′′) = p(S ∪ {r})Rl = 0 · Rl = 0 = P(x).
Case 2: Assume
∑
i∈S ai < Rf <
∑
i∈S∪{r} ai. From the definition of a semi-balanced strategy
it follows immediately that pixi
ai
> prxr
ar
for all i ∈ S. Hence,
Rl =
∑
i∈S∪{r}
xi >
∑
i∈S∪{r}
aiprxr
arpi
=
prxr
ar
∑
i∈S∪{r}
ai
pi
.
As a consequence, by Corollary 1 and Lemma 3, we have
P(x′′) = p(S ∪ {r})Rl =
Rl∑
i∈S∪{r}
ai
pi

 ∑
i∈S∪{r}
ai −Rf

 > prxr
ar

 ∑
i∈S∪{r}
ai −Rf

 = P(x).
Case 3: Assume Rf ≤
∑
i∈S ai and pr ≤ p(S). Then, by Corollary 1 and Lemma 3, it follows
immediately that
P(x′) = p(S)Rl ≥ p(S)(Rl − xr) + prxr = P(x).
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Case 4: Assume Rf ≤
∑
i∈S ai and pr > p(S). From the definition of a semi-balanced strategy
together with Lemma 3, it follows that, for all i ∈ S, we have
prxr
ar
<
pixi
ai
=
Rl − xr∑
j∈S
aj
pj
. (22)
Next, note that, by Corollary 1 and Lemma 3, we have
P(x′′)−P(x) = p (S ∪ {r})Rl − p(S)(Rl − xr) + prxr
=
(∑
i∈S∪{r} ai − Rf
)
Rl∑
i∈S∪{r}
ai
pi
−
((∑
i∈S ai − Rf
)
(Rl − xr)∑
i∈S
ai
pi
+ prxr
)
=
∑
i∈S
ai
pi

 ∑
i∈S∪{r}
ai − Rf

Rl − ∑
i∈S∪{r}
ai
pi
(∑
i∈S
ai −Rf
)
(Rl − xr)− prxr
∑
i∈S
ai
pi
∑
i∈S∪{r}
ai
pi∑
i∈S
ai
pi
∑
i∈S∪{r}
ai
pi
.
We will prove that the numerator of the latter expression is positive.
∑
i∈S
ai
pi

 ∑
i∈S∪{r}
ai − Rf

Rl − ∑
i∈S∪{r}
ai
pi
(∑
i∈S
ai −Rf
)
(Rl − xr)− prxr
∑
i∈S
ai
pi
∑
i∈S∪{r}
ai
pi
=
∑
i∈S
ai
pi
(∑
i∈S
ai − Rf
)
Rl + arRl
∑
i∈S
ai
pi
−
∑
i∈S
ai
pi
(∑
i∈S
ai − Rf
)
(Rl − xr)
−
ar
pr
(∑
i∈S
ai − Rf
)
(Rl − xr)− prxr
∑
i∈S
ai
pi
∑
i∈S
ai
pi
− arxr
∑
i∈S
ai
pi
= arRl
∑
i∈S
ai
pi
+ xr
∑
i∈S
ai
pi
(∑
i∈S
ai − Rf
)
−
ar
pr
(∑
i∈S
ai −Rf
)
(Rl − xr)
− prxr
∑
i∈S
ai
pi
∑
i∈S
ai
pi
− arxr
∑
i∈S
ai
pi
=
ar
pr
(Rl − xr) pr
∑
i∈S
ai
pi
+
ar
pr
(Rl − xr)
(
Rf −
∑
i∈S
ai
)
− xr
∑
i∈S
ai
pi
pr
∑
i∈S
ai
pi
− xr
∑
i∈S
ai
pi
(
Rf −
∑
i∈S
ai
)
=
(
ar
pr
(Rl − xr)− xr
∑
i∈S
ai
pi
)(
pr
∑
i∈S
ai
pi
+Rf −
∑
i∈S
ai
)
> 0,
where the inequality follows from (22) together with the assumption pr > p(S) for Case 4.
Hence, we can conclude
P(x′′) > P(x).
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Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. For notational convenience we denote in this proof Sx by S and Sx
′
by T . We distinguish
between three cases.
Case 1: Assume
∑
j∈S aj <
∑
j∈S∪T aj ≤ Rf . Then, p(S) = 0 and p(S ∪ T ) = 0, so all four
statements follow immediately.
Case 2: Assume
∑
j∈S aj ≤ Rf <
∑
j∈S∪T aj . Then, p(S) = 0 and p(S∪T ) =
∑
i∈S∪T ai−Rf∑
i∈S∪T
ai
pi
> 0,
so statement (i) and (iii) follow immediately. Moreover, the if condition of statement (ii) in
Lemma 5, pi ≤ p(S) = 0 for all i ∈ T , is not possible, because the production rates are
assumed to be strictly positive. We will now show that also the if condition of statement (iv)
in Lemma 5 is not possible. For this, suppose we have, for all i ∈ T ,
pi ≤ p(S ∪ T ) =
∑
j∈S∪T aj −Rf∑
j∈S∪T
aj
pj
.
Next, let k ∈ argmaxi∈T pi, then it follows that
∑
j∈S∪T
aj
pj
−
1
pk
( ∑
j∈S∪T
aj − Rf
)
≤ 0. (23)
As a consequence,
∑
j∈S
aj
pj
−
1
pk
(∑
j∈S
aj − Rf
)
=
∑
j∈S∪T
aj
pj
−
1
pk
( ∑
j∈S∪T
aj −Rf
)
−
(∑
i∈T
ai
pi
−
1
pk
∑
i∈T
ai
)
=
∑
j∈S∪T
aj
pj
−
1
pk
( ∑
j∈S∪T
aj −Rf
)
−
∑
i∈T
ai
(
1
pi
−
1
pk
)
(23)
≤ 0,
where the inequality also uses k ∈ argmaxi∈T pi and thus
1
pi
− 1
pk
≥ 0 for all i ∈ T . Hence, we
have
pk ≤
∑
j∈S aj − Rf∑
j∈S
aj
pj
≤ 0,
where the last inequality follows from the assumption for Case 2. Hence, we have pi ≤ 0 for all
i ∈ T , which is not possible, because the production rates are assumed to be strictly positive.
Case 3: Assume Rf <
∑
j∈S aj <
∑
j∈S∪T aj . We will now prove every statement separately.
(i) Assume pi ≥ p(S) for all i ∈ T . Then, for all i ∈ T , we have
∑
j∈S
aj
pj
−
1
pi
(∑
j∈S
aj −Rf
)
≥ 0, (24)
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As a consequence,
p(S ∪ T )− p(S) =
∑
j∈S∪T
aj −Rf
∑
j∈S∪T
aj
pj
−
∑
j∈S
aj −Rf
∑
j∈S
aj
pj
=
∑
j∈S
aj
pj
( ∑
j∈S∪T
aj − Rf
)
−
∑
j∈S∪T
aj
pj
(∑
j∈S
aj − Rf
)
∑
j∈S∪T
aj
pj
∑
j∈S
aj
pj
=
∑
j∈S
aj
pj
∑
j∈T
aj −
∑
j∈T
aj
pj
(∑
j∈S
aj −Rf
)
∑
j∈S∪T
aj
pj
∑
j∈S
aj
pj
=
∑
i∈T
ai
(∑
j∈S
aj
pj
−
1
pi
(∑
j∈S
aj − Rf
))
∑
j∈S∪T
aj
pj
∑
j∈S
aj
pj
(24)
≥ 0.
(ii) Assume pi ≤ p(S) for all i ∈ T . In a similar way as in the proof of statement (i) in Case
3 we can prove that p(S ∪ T ) ≤ p(S).
(iii) Assume pi ≥ p(S ∪ T ) for all i ∈ T . Let k ∈ argmini∈T pi, then we can prove in a similar
way as in Case 2 that
pk ≥
∑
j∈S aj − Rf∑
j∈S
aj
pj
= p(S).
Hence, pi ≥ p(S) for all i ∈ T and thus it follows immediately from Lemma 5(i) that p(S∪T ) ≥
p(S).
(iv) Assume pi ≤ p(S ∪ T ) for all i ∈ T . In a similar way as in the proof of statement (iii) in
Case 3, and using k ∈ argmaxi∈T pi, we can prove that p(S ∪ T ) ≤ p(S).
Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. Let x be an optimal strategy that is balanced. Note that such a strategy always exists
due to Lemma 4. Assume x is not seried. From strategy x we will construct an alternative
optimal balanced strategy x′′ that is seried, which proves the lemma. The outline of the
proof is as follows and consists of the following steps. First, we add facilities to Sx for which
the production rate is at least the composed net production rate p(Sx). Second, we exclude,
from this new set, the facilities for which the production rate is less than the production rate
production rate p(Sx). Next, we show that the resulting new balanced strategy is equally
good or better than strategy x, which implies that this new balanced strategy is also optimal.
At last, we will prove that this new optimal balanced strategy is seried.
For notational convenience we denote in this proof Sx by S. Next, denote the facility in S
with the highest index by s, i.e.,
s = max{i | i ∈ S}.
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Note that since x is not seried, we have S ⊂ {1, . . . , s}. Let x′ be the balanced strategy with
Sx
′
= S ∪ {i ∈ {1, . . . , s}\S | pi ≥ p(S)} .
Then, by Lemma 5(i), we have
p(Sx
′
) ≥ p(S). (25)
Note that if pi ≥ p(S) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , s}\S, then S
x′ = {1, . . . , s} and thus x′ is a seried
strategy.
On the other hand, if this is not the case, so there exists a facility i ∈ {1, . . . , s}\S with
pi < p(S), then x
′ is not seried. Therefore, we will continue to find a seried strategy as follows.
Let x′′ be the balanced strategy such that
Sx
′′
= Sx
′∖{
i ∈ Sx
′
| pi < p(S)
}
.
Note that, by (25) we have that pi < p(S) implies also pi < p(S
x′). As a consequence, by
Lemma 5(iv), we have
p(Sx
′′
) ≥ p(Sx
′
)
(25)
≥ p(S),
and thus
P(x′′) ≥ P(x). (26)
Hence, x′′ is also an optimal balanced strategy.
We will now show that x′′ is a seried strategy. We do this by first showing that Sx
′′
is
non-empty. After that, we show that every facility with an index lower than index t, where
facility t is the facility with the highest index in Sx
′′
, is also an element of Sx
′′
.
We will prove that Sx
′′
is non-empty by showing that facility 1 is an element of Sx
′′
. Since
p1 ≥ pi for all i ∈ N , we have
∑
i∈S
ai
pi
−
1
p1
(∑
i∈S
ai − Rf
)
=
∑
i∈S
ai
(
1
pi
−
1
p1
)
+
Rf
p1
≥ 0,
and thus
p1 ≥
∑
i∈S ai − Rf∑
i∈S
ai
pi
.
From this, together with the fact p1 > 0, we can conclude p1 ≥ max
{
∑
i∈S ai−Rf∑
i∈S
ai
pi
, 0
}
= p(S)
and thus facility 1 is an element of Sx
′′
, which implies that Sx
′′
6= ∅.
Next, let t = max{i | i ∈ Sx
′′
}. Note that t exists because Sx
′′
6= ∅. Moreover, note that
t ≤ s by construction of Sx
′
and Sx
′′
. In order to prove that x′′ is a seried strategy, we need
to show that, for all i ∈ N with i < t, we also have i ∈ Sx
′′
. For this, let i ∈ N with i < t.
Note that, since t ∈ Sx
′′
, we have pt ≥ p(S). As a consequence, because i < t, we have pi ≥ pt
and thus also
pi ≥ p(S). (27)
In order to prove that i ∈ Sx
′′
, we first show that i ∈ Sx
′
. For this, we distinguish between
two cases: i ∈ S and i 6∈ S. Note that if i ∈ S, then also i ∈ Sx
′
because S ⊆ Sx
′
. On the
other hand, if i 6∈ S, then from (27) together with the fact i < t ≤ s we can conclude i ∈ Sx
′
.
In conclusion, since i ∈ Sx
′
and due to (27), we also have i ∈ Sx
′′
. Hence, x′′ is indeed a seried
strategy with Sx
′′
= {1, . . . , t}. This, together with (26), concludes the proof.
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Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. First, note that it follows directly from the pseudocode that Algorithm 1 is a linear
time algorithm. Next, we show that Algorithm 1 finds an optimal strategy for the leader. For
this, let i∗ be highest index for which pi∗ > p({1, 2, . . . , i
∗ − 1}), i.e.,
i∗ = max{j ∈ N | pj > p({1, 2, . . . , j − 1})}.
Note that i∗ = i− 1, with i the end value of variable i in the algorithm. Moreover, note that
i∗ always exists, since p1 > 0 = p(∅). The definition of i
∗ implies that, for all j ∈ {1, 2 . . . , i∗},
we have
pj > p({1, 2, . . . , j − 1}).
By combining this with Lemma 5(i), it follows that, for all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , i∗}, we have
p({1, 2, . . . , j}) ≥ p({1, 2, . . . , j − 1}).
As a consequence,
p({1, 2, . . . , i∗}) ≥ p({1, 2, . . . , i∗ − 1}) ≥ . . . ≥ p({1, 2}) ≥ p({1}). (28)
We assume now, for the time being, that i∗ < n and thus index i∗+1 exists. By definition
of i∗ and because the production rates are in non-increasing order, we have
p({1, 2, . . . , i∗}) ≥ pi∗+1 ≥ pi∗+2 ≥ . . . ≥ pn−1 ≥ pn.
By combining this with Lemma 5(ii), it follows that, for all j ∈ {i∗+1, i∗+2, . . . , n}, we have
p({1, 2, . . . , i∗}) ≥ p({1, 2, . . . , j}. (29)
By combining (28) and (29), we conclude that, for all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, we have
p({1, 2, . . . , i∗) ≥ p({1, 2, . . . , j}). (30)
Note that, if i∗ = n, then (30) follows immediately from (28).
Using Corollary 1 together with (30), we conclude that seried-balanced strategy x∗ with
Sx
∗
= {1, 2, . . . , i∗} has, among all seried-balanced strategy, the highest worst case total
production after destruction. From Lemma 6 we know that there exists an optimal strategy
for the leader that is seried-balanced. As a result, seried-balanced strategy x∗ with Sx
∗
=
{1, 2, . . . , i∗} is an optimal strategy for the leader. From Lemma 2 we know
x∗i =


aiRl
pi
∑
j∈Sx∗
aj
pj
if i ∈ Sx
∗
,
0 if i ∈ N\Sx
∗
,
which is in line with the output of Algorithm 1.
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